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A Prisoner’s Constitutional Right to Medical Information:
Doctrinally Flawed and a Threat to State Informed Consent Law
Robert Gatter*
Abstract: White v. Napoleon and its progeny recognize a substantive due process right to
receive the disclosure of medical treatment information. While each case involves a
prisoner receiving treatment while in custody, the constitutional right described in those
cases is not limited to prisoners. Instead, the right is described as belonging to all
individuals. Consequently, this line of cases is poised to interfere with the disclosure
standards that operate in state informed consent law in the many instances where state
action exists. This Article argues that the substantive due process right recognized in
White should be overturned. The right is based on an erroneous assumption that the
Constitution protects an interest in autonomous medical decision-making rather than
simply an interest in avoiding a battery. It also will erode valuable heterogeneity in state
disclosure standards and subject those standards to the politics of substantive due process.
Third, it is not necessary. Other means exist to protect the interest of prisoners in
receiving material treatment information and to address states with uniquely inadequate
disclosure standards.

In 1990 the Third Circuit ruled in White v. Napoleon that a prisoner stated a
section 1983 claim against a prison physician when the prisoner alleged that the
physician refused to answer the prisoner’s request for information about a prescription
drug that the prison doctor recommended.1 In so ruling, the Court held that prisoners
have a substantive due process right under the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal
Constitution to sufficient information to make an intelligent choice about whether to
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See 897 F.2d 103 (3rd Cir. 1990).
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consent to or refuse proposed medical treatments, and that the alleged breach of this right
was sufficient to sustain the prisoner’s section 1983 claim.2
Since White, a series of cases has found that the Due Process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment protects as a fundamental liberty interest the right to receive
material information about medical treatment as part of the informed consent process.3
The right to receive medical information was held to derive from a foundational right to
refuse unwanted medical treatment, which is also protected under the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process clause.4 These courts reasoned that a right to refuse treatment
is meaningless unless it can be exercised intelligently, which requires that information be

2

See id.
See Rainwater v. Alarcon, 268 Fed. Appx. 531 (9th Cir. 2008) (summary judgment inappropriate where
material question of fact remains as to whether plaintiff received sufficient medical information pursuant to
the Fourteenth Amendment); Pabon v. Wright, 459 F. 3d 241 (2d Cir. 2006) (Fourteenth Amendment right
to refuse medical treatment carries with it a concomitant right to such information as a reasonable person
would need to make an informed decision about medical treatment); O’Neil v. U.S., 2008 WL 906470 (S.
D. W. Va. 2008) (overruling magistrate’s dismissal of prisoner’s claim that prison doctors violated his due
process rights under the Fifth Amendment by failing to provide the prisoner with medical information
sufficient to permit an informed decision regarding medical treatment); Benson v. Terhune, 304 F.3d 874
(9th Cir. 2002) (Due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects substantively the right to bodily
integrity, the right to refuse medical treatment, and the right to receive information sufficient to exercise
those rights intelligently); Lara v. Bloomberg, 2008 WL 123840 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (prisoner raised separate
Fourteenth Amendment claim when he alleged that prison physicians failed to provide him with
information about the side effects of a medical treatment even though the claim was dismissed for failure to
allege that the prison physicians acted with deliberate indifference to the prisoner’s rights); Clarkson v.
Coughlin, 898 F. Supp. 1019 (S.D.N.Y. 1995)(allegation that prison failed to provide a sign language
interpreter to help provide treatment information to deaf inmates is sufficient to allege a violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment due process right to receive treatment information so as to consent to or refuse
proposed medication); Alston v. Bendheim, ___ F.Supp.2d ___, 2009 WL 400355574 (D. __ Nov. 23,
2009)(claim that prison doctor violated a prisoner’s substantive due process right to the disclosure of
material information related to prescribed medication was dismissed but only for failure to sufficiently
allege the intent element of the claim). But see Wright v. Fred Hutchinson Cancer Research Center, 269 F.
Supp. 2d 1286 (W.D. Wash. 2002) (failure of researchers to disclose alleged financial conflicts of interest
did not violate the substantive due process rights of research subjects so long as subjects were informed that
they were participating in a medical experiment).
4
See e.g. Pabon, 459 F.3d at 249-250 (“in order to permit prisoners to exercise their right to refuse
unwanted treatment, there exists a liberty interest in receiving such information as a reasonable patient
would require in order to make an informed decision as to whether to accept or reject proposed medical
treatment.”).
3
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provided to a patient, and so the right to refuse treatment must give rise to a right to
receive medical information.5
Moreover, this line of cases equates the scope of the constitutional right to receive
medical information with the typical scope of a state-law right to receive all material
treatment information, including information about one’s diagnosis, prognosis, the nature
of the proposed treatment, the risks and benefits of the proposed treatments, any
alternatives to the proposed treatments, and the risks and benefits of any such
alternatives.6 In other words, White and its progeny transform disclosure duties under
state liability law into a constitutional duty, at least whenever state action exists.
This Article argues that White and cases that have relied on its holding were
wrongly decided both as a matter of constitutional doctrine and as a matter of policy.
First, they rest on an unreasonable extrapolation from the U.S. Supreme Court’s opinion
in Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health7 concerning the right to refuse lifesustaining medical treatment. Cruzan should be read in the context of later cases
confirming the power of states to outlaw physician-assisted suicide and the authority of
government to inject itself into the informed consent process for abortion procedures.
Doing so reveals that individuals likely have a substantive due process right to avoid
unwanted bodily invasions, but not a right to well-informed treatment decisions. This
seems all the more likely given the Supreme Court’s instruction that substantive due

5

See id.
See e.g., Benson, 304 F.3d at 884 and 884 n.10 (describing the elements of disclosure and equating them
with typical state disclosure requirements).
7
See 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
6
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process claims be resolved on the narrowest possible terms and that federal courts guard
against an expansive reading of the Due Process clause.8
In short, the right of prisoners to be provided with material information about
proposed medical care as part of the informed consent process as articulated in White is
not secure because it is based on a weak doctrinal foundation. Furthermore, it is not
necessary to protect the interest of prisoners in sufficient treatment information. Other
alternatives exist, including the State’s constitutional obligation to provide for the
medical needs of those it holds in custody and state and federal tort claims.9
Even beyond doctrine, however, protecting the medical interests of prisoners by
recognizing a constitutional right for all to receive treatment information is a bad idea
because it will confound state informed consent law. The state action doctrine is not
sufficient to prevent individuals outside of prison from challenging the validity of state
informed consent law because state action exists in many such cases. In those cases, the
federal constitutional right to the disclosure of material treatment information would
trump any state-law right. This would result in each state’s either enforcing two different
disclosure standards (a federal one for physicians when they are state actors and a statelaw standard for when they are not) or adopting the constitutional standard as the statelaw standard. Either way the authority of states to regulate the medical profession is
significantly diminished. Moreover, when White’s constitutional right to the disclosure
of material treatment information is used to challenge state informed consent law, it will
subject state law to the politics of federal substantive due process jurisprudence.

8

See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720-721(1997) (warning that substantive due process rights
should be expanded only reluctantly and then based only on careful description).
9
See infra notes 86through 94 and the accompanying text.
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In short, a right to the disclosure of material treatment information based, as it is
under White, on a substantive due process right to refuse unwanted medical treatment
threatens to destabilize state informed consent law. We are better served by relying on
other means for enforcing a prisoner’s right to the disclosure of treatment information
that are unlikely to affect state disclosure standards. Of course, this would mean that
individuals could not use White to challenge woefully inadequate disclosure standards
that exist in several states. Other strategies exist, however, to assure that patients in those
states receive an adequate minimum of information as part of the informed consent
process, including the enforcement of disclosure standards in mandatory institutional
policies, professional licensure actions, and – where state action exists – equal protection
claims.
Part I describes White and its progeny as well as the reasoning that led to finding a
right to receive treatment information. Part II critiques that line of cases as resting on an
overly broad interpretation of Cruzan and concluding that a prisoner’s interest in
informed medical decision-making would be better protected if the right to the disclosure
of treatment information were enforced through the Eighth Amendment or state and
federal tort claims available to prisoners. Part III argues that a substantive due process
right to the disclosure of material treatment information as articulated in White threatens
to invade and alter disclosure standards under state law, which will undermine state
regulation of medical practice and distort the normative framework of state informed
consent law by subjecting it to federal substantive due process jurisprudence. Part III
also argues that a broadly applicable substantive due process right to the disclosure of

5
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material treatment information is not necessary to address even the most inadequate state
disclosure standards.

I.

White v. Napoleon and the Cases that Followed
Like most of the cases that have addressed whether the Fourteenth Amendment’s

Due Process Clause creates a right to receive treatment information, the dispute in White
v. Napoleon arose out of medical care provided to an inmate. Norwood White was one of
three prisoners in the New Jersey prison system who jointly filed a civil rights suit
against a prison physician, Dr. John Napoleon. White first came under the care of Dr.
Napoleon when White was transferred from one prison to the prison at which Dr.
Napoleon worked. White suffered from persistent ear infections, which had been brought
under control by a different physician who had treated White prior to White’s transfer.
White requested that Dr. Napoleon continue that course of treatment, and the doctor
refused. Instead, Dr. Napoleon insisted on pursuing treatments that, when attempted by
White’s prior physician, had proven ineffective and painful.10 This was the common
starting place for each of White’s many complaints about the quality of care he received
from Dr. Napoleon, including White’s consent-related complaint. He alleged that, at one
point, Dr. Napoleon recommended that White use a substance called “Debrox.”11 White,
who was allergic to penicillin, asked about the ingredients of Debrox in an effort to
assure himself that it did not contain penicillin.12 White alleged that Dr. Napoleon would
not tell White anything about the substance except that it was a cleansing solution.13 As a

10
11
12
13

See 897 F.2d 103, 106-107.
See id.
See id.
See id.
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result, White refused the Debrox, and Dr. Napoleon filed disciplinary charges against
White for failing to cooperate with the prescribed treatment plan.14
White’s suit claimed that he had a constitutional right to be informed about the
recommended treatment as well as a right to be free from retaliation by Dr. Napoleon for
seeking to exercise his right to be informed.15 Further, he claimed that Dr. Napoleon
filed disciplinary charges with malicious intent to discourage White and other prisoners
from exercising their right to refuse treatments he recommended.16 Dr. Napoleon moved
to dismiss White’s claim, and the federal district court granted the motion.17 White
appealed, and a panel of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the
ruling. The appellate court held that the district court erred in interpreting White’s claim
as a procedural due process claim only rather than also considering it as a substantive due
process claim.18 The Court of Appeals then went on to find that White adequately
alleged a claim based on a substantive due process analysis.19
Central to the Third Circuit’s analysis was that a right to receive treatment
information is implicit in the substantive due process right to refuse unwanted medical
treatment. The Court wrote that a “right to refuse treatment is useless without knowledge
of the proposed treatment,” 20 and thus it recognized a right to be informed of treatment
information.21 Moreover, the Court noted that the right to refuse treatment – from which
the right to receive treatment information springs – is itself “derive[d] from each person’s
fundamental right to be free from unjustified intrusions on personal security,” a right that
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21

See id.
See id. at 111.
See id.
See id. at 105.
See id. at 111.
See id. at 111-114.
Id. 113.
See id.
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the Court also described as a liberty interest in being free of “unjustified intrusions of the
body.”22 Thus, while the constitutional right to receive information described in White
might arise out of a right to refuse treatment, both of these rights are based fundamentally
on a liberty interest in being personally secure and free of unwanted bodily invasions.
Having recognized a right to the disclosure of treatment information, the Court in
White went on to describe the extent of the right. It held that individuals “have a right to
such information as is reasonably necessary to make an informed decision to accept or
reject proposed treatment as well as a reasonable explanation of the viable alternative
treatments . . . .”23 This standard is likely indistinguishable from the typical disclosure
standard enforced by state courts in most professional liability claims by patients against
their doctors for failure to disclose treatment information.24 The typical standard requires
doctors to disclose all information “material” to the patient’s treatment decision,25 which
generally includes the patient’s diagnosis and prognosis, the nature of the proposed
treatment, any viable alternative treatments, and the risks of the proposed and each of the
alternative treatments.26 Yet, the Third Circuit also recognized that the application of this
standard had to account for the prison setting in which the physician in this case was
determining what, if any, information to provide. So the Court held that a “prison
doctor’s decision to refuse to answer an inmate’s questions about treatment will be
presumed valid unless it is such a substantial departure from professional judgment,

22

Id. at 112.
Id. at 113.
24
See Benson, 304 F.3d 874,884 n.10 (describing the informational requirement established in White as
“akin to the main components of the general doctrine of informed consent as statutorily mandated for
medical practitioners in most states: diagnosis of condition, nature and purpose of the treatment, description
of anticipated benefits and risks and alternative treatments (including no treatment) and their related
risks.”).
25
See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir 1972).
26
See supra note 24.
23
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practice or standards as to demonstrate that the doctor did not base the decision on such a
judgment.”27 The Court went on to note that, “in exercising judgment . . . the doctor must
consider a prisoner’s reasonable need to make an informed decision to accept or reject
treatment, as well as his need to know any viable alternatives that can be made available
in prison.”28 Accordingly, White holds that the constitutional right to the disclosure of
treatment information is a right to the disclosure of the same treatment information that
most states require physicians provide to patients under common law liability standards,
but a breach of that right in the prison setting is actionable as a civil rights claim only
when the physician’s decision to provide or withhold particular treatment information
was not based on a professional judgment that accounted for the prisoner’s need to make
an informed treatment decision.
With one exception discussed below, the case law since White was decided has
largely followed its lead. Several opinions employ the constitutional right to treatment
information with little or no analysis.29 The few that provide some analysis adopt
White’s reasoning that a constitutional right to refuse treatment necessarily gives rise to a
right to the disclosure of treatment information that will enable an informed treatment
decision.30
There are, however, a few noteworthy developments. First, it might be assumed
that White applies only in the context of prisoners because it involves medical care
provided to a prisoner by a prison physician, and because the law imposes a special
27

Id.
Id.
29
See Rainwater v. Alarcon, 268 Fed. Appx.; O’Neil v. U.S., 2008 WL 906470; Lara v. Bloomberg, 2008
WL 123840.
30
See Pabon, 459 F.3d 241, 249 (“[a]bsent knowledge of the risks or consequences that a particular
treatment entails, a reasoned decision about whether to accept or reject that treatment is not possible”);
Benson, 304 F.3d 874, 884 (acknowledging the right to receive treatment information as a corollary to the
right to refuse treatment).
28
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obligation on state and federal governments to care adequately for those is takes into
custody.31 But language in White and developments in case law since White clarify that
the right to treatment information is intended to be a right for all and not just for those in
confinement.
Rather than argue that the right to receive treatment information sprung from the
state’s duty to care for those it confines, the White Court held that the right is “retained”
by individuals despite imprisonment, even though the right may be circumscribed by the
state’s legitimate interests in operating a prison.32 The choice of the word “retained” in
that context signals the Court’s belief that everyone enjoys the right to receive treatment
information, not just prisoners.
Furthermore, the right to receive treatment information was derived from a right
to refuse medical treatment, and, shortly after White was decided, the U.S. Supreme
Court in Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health acknowledged that the right
to refuse treatment could be inferred from the Court’s prior opinions.33 Cruzan
concerned a patient in a persistent vegetative state whose parents sought to enforce what
31

See Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 317 (1982) (“As a general matter, the State is under no
obligation to provide substantive services for those within its border [,] . . . [but w]hen a person is
institutionalized – and wholly dependent on the State – . . . a duty to provide certain services and care does
exist . . . .”).
32
See id. at 112-113.
33
See 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990). The majority opinion in Cruzan did not actually hold that a competent
person has a substantive due process right to refuse unwanted treatment; rather, the Court’s statements on
the issue were more limited. In order to bypass the question of whether such a right is constitutionally
protected and move instead to an analysis of countervailing State interests, the Court merely “assumed”
that a right to refuse treatment is a fundamental liberty interest under the Fourteenth Amendment. See id.
Additionally, as noted above, the Court stated only that such a right “may be inferred” from the Court’s
prior rulings. The Court’s acknowledgement of this inference, despite being dicta, has sent a strong signal
that the Court would rule in favor of constitutional protection for such a right if faced squarely with the
issue; so strong, in fact, that Cruzan is repeatedly cited as proof that a constitutional right to refuse
treatment already exists. See e.g., Rainwater, 269 Fed.Appx. 531, 534 n.2. Indeed, the Supreme Court
itself has been caught under the weight of its assumption and dicta from Cruzan. In the process of rejecting
a claimed substantive due process right to physician-assisted suicide, which was based in part on the
Cruzan assumption and dicta, the Court did not simply rest on the fact that its statements were not holdings.
Instead, it went to the trouble of clarifying the would-be right in Cruzan so as to distinguish it from the
claimed right to physician-assisted suicide. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 722-725 (1997).
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they believed to be the patient’s preference to have life-sustaining medical treatment
discontinued. Because it did not involve a prisoner or one who was involuntarily
committed to state custody, Cruzan’s acknowledgement of a right to refuse treatment
does not rest on a special state duty to provide care. Thus, Cruzan lends support to the
claim that the right to refuse treatment and other rights that derive from it belong to all
individuals.34 Indeed, cases addressing the right to treatment information after White cite
to Cruzan as providing a foundation from which to derive a constitutional right to
treatment information.35
Also noteworthy is that cases after White also have interpreted the right to
treatment information to include a right to receive the disclosure of treatment information
by one’s physician whether or not one asked for it, and not merely a right to pursue such
information oneself. White involved a patient who asked for treatment information and
whose physician refused the request. Thus, the right to treatment information applied in
White could have been interpreted as only a right to receive answers to questions asked
about proposed treatments. The Ninth Circuit seemed to employ this limitation on the
right to treatment information in its 2002 opinion in Benson v. Terhune.36 Upholding the
denial of a habeas corpus relief, the Court held that a prisoner waived her right to receive
information about psychotropic drugs when she did not ask for the information prior to

34

Further support might be found in Wright v. Fred Hutchinson Cancer Research Center, 269 F. Supp. 2d
1286 (W.D. Wash. 2002) where a substantive due process right to the disclosure of information related to
medical research was raised by individuals who were not being held in government custody. In that case
the plaintiffs were individuals who had volunteered to participate in medical research and who claimed that
they had a substantive due process right to the disclosure of information relating to the researchers’
potential financial conflicts of interest. While the claim was dismissed, it was not dismissed because the
plaintiffs were not prisoners or otherwise held involuntarily.
35
See Pabon 459 F.3d 241, 249; Rainwater, 269 Fed.Appx. 531, 534 n.2.
36
304 F.3d 874 (9th Cir. 2002).
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ingesting the drugs,37 concluding that “the jail staff had no affirmative duty to volunteer
information about the drugs.”38 But the apparent limitation employed in Benson seems to
have been an aberration because courts – including the Ninth Circuit in an opinion after
Benson39 – have ruled that the right to treatment information applies to require the
disclosure of information even when a patient has not asked for it. For example, in
Pabon v. Wright40 the Second Circuit held that a prisoner, whose treatments in prison for
Hepatitis C included a liver biopsy and doses of interferon, had a right under the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process clause to be provided with risk information by his
physicians prior to consenting to treatment, and it did so without addressing whether or
not the prisoner asked for such information.41
While most cases to have addressed a claimed right to treatment information have
recognized a right to receive all information that is reasonably necessary to enable a
patient to make an informed decision, there is one exception. In Wright v. Fred
Hutchinson Cancer Research Center, a federal district court dismissed a section 1983
claim alleging that the research center and several of its staff physician-researchers had
violated the substantive due process rights of several human subjects participating in a
cancer study when they failed to disclose their financial interests in the outcome of the
study.42 In so ruling, the Court acknowledged that a human subject has a protected

37

See id. at 883-885 (employing standard for a knowing waiver of Miranda rights to analyze whether the
prisoner had waived the right to treatment information acknowledged in White).
38
Id. at 885.
39
See Rainwater v. Alarcon, 268 Fed. Appx. 531 (9th Cir. 2008).
40
459 F.3d 241 (2d Cir. 2006).
41
See id. at 249-250. This holding was part of an analysis of whether the defendants were entitled to
qualified immunity. Despite finding that the prisoner had a constitutional right to receive treatment
information from his physicians, which was violated by his physicians, the Court held that the defendants
were entitled to qualified immunity because the right to treatment information was not clearly established
under the law at the time of the alleged breach. See id. at 254-255.
42
269 F. Supp. 2d 1286, 1294-1297 (W.D. Wash. 2002).
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liberty interest in being told that she is participating in an experiment rather than in
therapeutic treatment,43 but it declined to extend that right any farther. The plaintiffs’
claim failed under this standard because the plaintiffs knew that they were participating
in an experiment that might or might not provide therapeutic benefit.44 It also explained
away the holding in White on the grounds that the Court in White had not intended every
tortuous breach of the duty to obtain informed consent to be a constitutional violation.45
Accordingly, Wright should be understood to recognize a right to treatment information,
but one that is substantially more limited than the right applied in White and its progeny.
Rather than acknowledge a right to receive all information necessary for an individual to
make an informed decision about whether to refuse or consent to treatment, the Wright
Court recognized only a right to be informed of whether proposed treatment is being
provided as part of a medical experiment and, if so, the likelihood that the experimental
treatment will provide therapeutic benefit.
In the end, a substantive due process right to treatment information has taken root.
It has been recognized and applied by the Second, Third and Ninth Circuits and by
several district courts in those circuits. It is not a liberty interest unto itself; rather, it is
derived from the liberty interest to refuse unwanted treatment. Additionally, it is
generally interpreted as a right to be provided with treatment information from a health
care provider even in the absence of a request for such information by the patient.
Moreover, most courts interpret the right to be fulfilled only when the patient has been

43

See id. at 1294.
See id. at 1295.
45
See id. Given that the research center in this case is a private institution, the state action on which the
claim must be based is unclear, and the Court’s opinion does not address – or even mention – this issue.
See infra section III.A. for a discussion of the state action doctrine as an incomplete barrier to the use of the
prisoner’s right to the disclosure of treatment information outside of the prison setting.
44

13

45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. ___ (forthcoming 2010)

provided with all information necessary to make an informed treatment decision, which is
virtually identical to the standard for disclosure employed by most states for the purpose
of determining liability in informed consent cases.

II.
The Right to Refuse Treatment as Right to Avoid a Battery Rather than a
Right to Autonomous Decision-Making
A fundamental flaw in White and its progeny is their misinterpretation of the
constitutional right to refuse treatment from which those cases claimed to derive a right to
treatment information. As argued herein, a constitutional right to refuse treatment is
primarily a right to have one’s refusal of treatment respected by others so as to be free of
an unwanted bodily invasion, which right is significantly narrower than a right to
autonomous medical decision-making. Because a right to refuse treatment is concerned
with the actions of others in the face of an individual’s refusal of invasive treatment, it is
only incidentally concerned with the decision-making process that resulted in the
treatment refusal. This is evident in Supreme Court opinions that clarify the liberty
interest at issue is the prevention of a battery rather than the protection of a broad notion
of personal autonomy,46 that allow states to promote or restrict treatment refusals by third
parties on behalf of incompetent individuals,47 and that uphold state regulations that
substantially influence the communication of material treatment information from
physician to patient but do not unduly burden the patient’s right to consent to or refuse
treatment.48 Such case law – especially when read together with Supreme Court
instructions to construe the boundaries of substantive liberty interests narrowly – suggests
46

See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
See Cruzan, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
48
See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1990) and Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
47
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that a constitutional right to have others respect a treatment refusal requires a refusal
made without undue influence and with knowledge of only the invasive nature of the
treatment. If so, then the right of prisoners to receive disclosure of material treatment
information, as articulated in White and its progeny, is unstable because it lacks a sound
constitutional foundation.
A.
Separating Consent to a Bodily Invasion from the Assumption of
Treatment Risks and the Waiver of Alternative Treatments
Central to the claim that the constitutional right to refuse treatment necessarily
gives rise to a right to receive the disclosure of material treatment information is the
argument that a right to refuse treatment is “meaningless” without all such information.49
The argument reflects a belief that the right to refuse treatment cannot be separated
“meaningfully” from the right to do so with the benefit of material treatment information.
The logic underlying this belief goes something like this: (1) there is a right to refuse
treatment, which (2) implies a right to make an autonomous treatment decision, which (3)
cannot be realized unless the decision-maker has all material information to make an
informed decision, and so (4) the right to refuse treatment implies a right to receive
information necessary for an informed choice.50 As explained below, however, this logic
is undercut by the structure of informed consent law.
In most states the right to consent to or refuse treatment commonly is closely
related to the right to material treatment information, and certainly a fully informed
treatment decision is better than one based on incomplete or no information. Yet, it is not
true that the right to consent to or refuse treatment is “meaningless” in the absence of all

49

See supra note 5; White, 897 F.2d 103, 113.
For a theoretical accounting of what autonomous decision-making means in the context of informed
consent, see FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 114.

50
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material treatment information. An individual who voluntarily consents to an invasive
treatment with an understanding of the invasive nature of the treatment can be said to
have autonomously authorized the bodily invasion – the “touching” to put it in battery
terms – that takes place in the course of treatment. This is true even if she is uninformed
of the material risks of and alternatives to the treatment. In such a case, the patient has
consented to the touching involved in the treatment even though she has not assumed the
undisclosed risks of the treatment nor waived her right to receive an alternative treatment.
In other words, the bodily invasion that the treatment imposes, the assumption of each
material risk of that treatment, and the waiver of each viable alternative to the treatment
are separate aspects of informed consent that can receive protection under the law
separately.
The independence of these aspects of informed consent is clearly reflected in
nearly all states’ informed consent law.51 Indeed, the doctrine acknowledges two
separate duties that are imposed on physicians: a duty to refrain from providing medical
care to a patient without the patient’s consent, and a duty to disclose material information
about a proposed treatment to a patient prior to seeking the patient’s consent.52 A battery
theory is used when a physician is alleged to have violated the first duty of the informed
consent doctrine: the duty to refrain from treating without the prior consent of the

51

See Joan H. Krause, Reconceptualizing Informed Consent in an Era of Health Care Cost Containment,
85 IOWA L. REV. 261, 309 (1999) (most jurisdictions recognize a negligence action for failure to adequately
disclose treatment information and a battery action for the failure to obtain consent to treatment at all).
52
See Robert Gatter, Informed Consent and the Forgotten Duty of Physician Inquiry, 31 LOY. U. CHI. L.J.
557(2000) . See also Franklin v. U.S., 992 F.2d 1492, 1496 (10th Cir. 1993); Scott v. Bradford, 606 P.2d
554, 557 (Okla. 1979); Lounsbury v. Capel, 836 P.2d 188 (Utah App. 1992); Ketchup v. Howard, 543
S.E.2d 371, 374 (Ga. App. 2000), overruled on other grounds by Blotner v. Doreika, 678 S.E.2d 80 (Ga.
2009).
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patient.53 The complete lack of consent in such a case results in treating the procedure as
an offensive touching and a compensable harm.54
Meanwhile, a patient who consented to treatment but claims that she was
informed insufficiently about a treatment risk because her physician breached the second
duty – the duty to disclose material treatment information – may only pursue her claim
under a negligence theory.55 Here the violation is not the “touching” because the patient
consented to the treatment. Instead, it is the failure of the physician to warn of a potential
harm associated with the treatment, which means that responsibility for any harm that
arises from that particular risk was not assumed by the patient and remains with the
physician. Consequently, the only compensable harm in such a case is harm to the
patient caused by the materialization of the undisclosed – and therefore non-assumed –
risk. 56 In short, the laws of nearly all states recognize that insufficient understanding of
the material risks of and alternatives to a treatment does not negate one’s consent to
treatment.
Such an overwhelming consensus among states’ laws is evidence of a common
normative view that consent to a bodily invasion is different from a decision to assume
the risks of a treatment and to forgo alternative treatments. Consequently, consent to the
bodily invasion that results from treatment is independently meaningful under the law
even if it is given without an understanding of the risks of and alternatives to that
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See e.g., McNeil v. Brewer, 710 N.E.2d 1285, 1288 (Ill. App. 1999). See also supra note 52.
See e.g., Harvey v. Strickland, 566 S.E.2d 529, 536 n.4 (pain and suffering from a completely
unauthorized treatment is a cognizable injury).
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See JESSICA BERG ET AL, INFORMED CONSENT: LEGAL THEORY AND CLINICAL PRACTICE __ (2d ed.
2001). See also supra note 52.
54
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See Cantebury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 777 (DC Cir. 1972)(a compensable injury occurs only when an
unrevealed risk actually materializes and causes harm); Prissel v. Physicians Ins. Co. of Wis., 2003 WL
2998133, at *10-11 (Wis. App. 2003).
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treatment. To be clear, a liability regime that recognizes only a duty to obtain consent to
a medical touching certainly fails to protect patients adequately. Nevertheless, the law’s
recognition that consent to a medical touching as distinct from consent to the risks of and
alternatives to the touching is rational and meaningful.
If a right to consent to or refuse the bodily invasion associated with a treatment
can exist separately from a right to consent to material risks and to the waiver of each
alternative treatment, then this substantially narrows any derived right to information. To
autonomously consent to the physical invasion of treatment, a patient would need to
understand only that the treatment is invasive and that she has the right to refuse the
invasion. This, of course, is substantially less than information about all material risks
and alternatives.
B. The Rights to Treatment and Information under Supreme Court Precedent
The failure of White and its progeny to distinguish between an individual’s
interest in avoiding non-consensual, medical invasions of her body from her interest in
making well-informed treatment decisions is critical to understanding why the claimed
right to treatment information lacks doctrinal support. This is because the U.S. Supreme
Court has recognized such a distinction in its substantive due process analysis in Cruzan
and in Washington v. Glucksberg. As explained below, these cases indicate that the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process clause protects an individual’s interest in avoiding
unwanted bodily invasions associated with treatment, but not an individual’s interest
autonomous medical decision-making.
In Cruzan the Court held that a substantive due process right to refuse treatment
was not violated by a Missouri law prohibiting family members of an incompetent patient
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from refusing life-sustaining medical treatment on the patient’s behalf absent clear and
convincing evidence that the patient, if competent, would refuse such treatment.57
Contrary to popular conception, the Court did not hold that an individual has a right to
refuse unwanted treatment. Rather, it assumed, without holding, that such a right is
protected as a liberty interest under the Fourteenth Amendment so that the Court could
reach the issue it preferred to rule on: namely, whether countervailing state interests
justified a deprivation of the assumed right to refuse treatment.58 Yet, Cruzan provides
substantial support for a substantive due process right to refuse treatment through its dicta
that a constitutional right to refuse unwanted treatment can be inferred from the Court’s
prior rulings.59 Indeed, the Court’s analysis of its prior rulings indicate how difficult it
would be for the Court, if faced squarely with the issue, to reach any conclusion other
than that a constitutional right exists to refuse the bodily invasion associated with an
invasive treatment.
At the same time, the Court’s review of prior rulings that gave rise to the Court’s
dicta reveals that a substantive due process right to refuse treatment is a right to avoid the
bodily invasion associated with an invasive treatment, which, absent a patient’s consent,
would constitute a battery. The holdings to which the Court cites each address the right
to be free from unnecessary bodily invasion or physical confinement.60 Justice
O’Connor’s concurrence also makes this clear, acknowledging that “the liberty interest in
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See 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
See supra note 33.
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See id.
60
See id. at 278-279. For example, the Court cites to Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221-222
(1990), and quotes the following statement from the case: “’The forcible injection of medication into a
nonconsenting person’s body represents a substantial interference with that person’s liberty.’” Id. It also
cites to Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 600 (1979), and quotes the following line: “’[A] child, in common
with adults, has a substantial liberty interest in not being confined unnecessarily for medical treatment.’”
Id.
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refusing unwanted medical treatment flows from decisions involving the State’s
invasions into the body.”61 Her opinion goes on to explain the many ways that medical
treatment of an unwilling patient, including the forcible provision of artificial nutrition
and hydration, involves bodily “restraint and intrusion” that implicates a protected liberty
interest and justifies a constitutional obligation of the state to respect an individual’s
decision to refuse treatment.62 Thus, Cruzan establishes that a constitutional right to
refuse treatment is not a right about autonomous medical decision-making, but rather a
right to be free of unwanted incursions into one’s body, which is protected by requiring
the state to honor an individual’s refusal of such physical invasions.
Cruzan discusses state informed consent law, but Cruzan did not find that a right
to informed consent is a corollary to the assumed right to refuse treatment. Rather, the
Court recognized that states have widely adopted the informed consent doctrine, which
protects individuals from bodily invasions absent their consent, and that a “logical
corollary of the doctrine of informed consent is that the patient generally possess the right
not to consent, that is, to refuse treatment.”63 Thus, while it recognized that a right to
refuse treatment could be derived from a right to consent to treatment, the Court said
nothing about deriving a constitutional right to the information disclosures commonly
afforded by state informed consent law from a right to refuse treatment.
Thus, the Court in Cruzan outlined a right to refuse treatment on rather narrow
terms as a right to avoid a medical invasion of the body rather than a broader notion of a
right to autonomous medical decision-making. It did so not only because the narrower
understanding of the right was most consistent with the Court’s prior rulings, but also
61
62
63

Id. at 287 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
See id. at 287-290.
Id. at 270.
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because it was in keeping with precedent that counseled federal courts to avoid an
expansive interpretation of substantive due process rights. Thus, in justifying the Court’s
decision to assume, rather than hold, that a right to refuse treatment is constitutionally
protected, Justice Rehnquist wrote:
This is the first case in which we have been squarely presented with the issue
whether the United States Constitution grants what is in common parlance
referred to as a “right to die.” We follow the judicious counsel . . . that in
deciding “a question of such magnitude and importance . . . it is the [better] part
of wisdom not to attempt, by any general statement, to cover every possible phase
of the subject.”64
If any confusion remained after Cruzan about whether the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process clause protects a right to be free of unwanted medical
intrusions into the body or a broader right to autonomous medical decision-making, it
was resolved by the Court’s holding in Washington v. Glucksberg several years later.65
There, the Court upheld a ban on assisted suicide imposed by the State of Washington
against a claim by several terminally ill patients and their physicians that it violated their
liberty interests to have the state respect their personal choices to participate in physicianassisted suicide. Although the petitioning patients were not receiving unwanted lifesustaining medical treatment, the patients relied on Cruzan to make their case. They
argued that, by acknowledging a right to refuse life-sustaining treatment, Cruzan
recognized that individuals have a substantive due process right to choose to hasten death
by any means and to have the state respect such a personal choice. The Court rejected
this assessment of Cruzan, clarifying again that a right to refuse treatment is not a right to
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Id. at 277-278.
See 521 U.S. 702 (1997). See also Giordano v. Connecticut Valley Hospital, 588 F. Supp. 2d 306 (D.
Conn. 2008) (analyzing the right to refuse treatment from Cruzan in light of the later Glucksberg decision).
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autonomous decision-making, but rather a right to avoid a medical battery arising out of a
tradition evident in state medical consent laws. The Court wrote:
The right assumed in Cruzan . . . was not simply deduced from abstract concepts
of personal autonomy. Given the common-law rule that forced medication was a
battery, and the long legal tradition protecting the decision to refuse unwanted
medical treatment, our assumption was entirely consistent with this Nation’s
history and constitutional traditions.66
The Court similarly rejected the claim that Due Process protects a liberty interest
in making “intimate and personal choices” without undue state influence, which would
encompass a right to choose to participate in physician-assisted suicide. In doing so, the
Court wrote: “That many of the rights and liberties protected by the Due Process Clause
sound in personal autonomy does not warrant the sweeping conclusion that any and all
important, intimate, and personal decisions are so protected . . . .”67 This was a
justification for why the Constitution has been read to protect the personal choice of a
woman to have an abortion, but not the personal choice of a terminally ill individual to
participate in physician-assisted suicide.68 Yet, the case reveals that autonomy for the
sake of protecting against invasions of one’s body is constitutionally different from other
applications of autonomy, and this helps to explain further how the Due Process clause
can require states to respect an individual’s refusal of a bodily intrusion associated with a
proposed medical treatment without necessarily requiring states to facilitate autonomous
medical decision-making.
Glucksberg also reaffirms that substantive due process rights must be interpreted
very narrowly. It notes that, for fear of placing important matters “outside the arena of
public debate and legislative action,” the Court has “’always been reluctant to expand the
66
67
68

Id. at 725.
Id. at 727.
See id. at 727-728.
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concept of substantive due process because guideposts for responsible decisionmaking in
this uncharted area are scarce and open-ended.’”69 Accordingly, such constitutional
protection is afforded only to fundamental rights and liberties that are “’deeply rooted in
this Nation’s history and tradition.’”70 Moreover, such history and tradition are used as
parameters to craft a “careful description” of any substantive due process rights
recognized by the Court.71, 72 The Court used these principles to distinguish between the
assumed right to avoid a medical battery and the claimed right to choose to participate in
physician-assisted suicide, finding that the former has a long history in state laws
requiring consent to medical treatment while the latter is contradicted by the historical
bans states have placed on suicide and assisted suicide.73
These rules of construction in substantive due process jurisprudence indicate that
the Court would not hold that a right to the disclosure of all material treatment
information necessarily arises from a right to refuse treatment. Instead, the Court would
more likely construe narrowly the assumed right in Cruzan as a right to have the state
respect a decision to refuse treatment, rejecting a broader interpretation of that right as a
right of autonomy in medical decision-making. Further, the Court would likely find that
such an interpretation of the right to refuse treatment is supported in the nation’s legal
history, which reveals that states required consent to treatment well before requiring the
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Id. at 720 quoting Collins v. Harker, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992).
Id. at 721 quoting Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977).
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See id. at 721
72
In Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), which was decided after Glucksberg, the Supreme Court
appeared to re-establish a more expansive test for identifying substantive liberty interests than the historyand-traditions test from Glucksberg. See generally Steven G. Calabresi, Substantive Due Process After
Gonzales v. Carhart, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1517 (2008). Since Lawrence, however, the Court revived the
Glucksberg test in what has been described as “a pro-judicial restraint, anti-substantive due process
decision.” Id. at 1520.
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See id. at 710-719, 724-726.
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disclosure of treatment information in support of any request for consent,74 and that a
consent to the bodily invasion associated with a treatment is not negated under almost
any state’s law by a lack of material treatment information.75
The Supreme Court’s abortion jurisprudence is also instructive because it
indicates the degree to which the Court interprets the Due Process clause to protect a
right to informed medical decision-making. In Rust v. Sullivan76 and in Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,77 the Court addressed the
constitutionality of governmental manipulation of abortion information disclosed by
physicians to pregnant women. Read together, they suggest that substantive due process
protects individuals from fraud and coercion in medical decision-making, but does not
obligate States to assure that medical decisions are well informed.
In Rust the Court reviewed federal regulations that, among other things,
prohibited physicians, who care for indigent, non-pregnant or recently pregnant women
through a federally funded, family planning program, from either counseling their
patients about abortion or referring them for abortion. One issue was whether those
regulatory prohibitions on the disclosure of abortion as a treatment option deprived
women served by the program of a substantive due process right to make informed
medical decisions free of governmental intrusions.78 If a woman served under the
program were to ask her physician about abortion or were to seek an abortion referral, the
regulations permitted her physician to respond that “’the project does not consider
74

See FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 114.
See supra notes 49 and 56 and the accompanying text.
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500 U.S. 173 (1991).
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505 U.S. 833 (1992).
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See id. at 1776-1778. Because the challenged was aimed at federal regulations, the substantive due
process claim in this case was based on the Due Process Clause in the Fifth Amendment of the federal
Constitution.
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abortion an appropriate method of family planning and therefore does not counsel or refer
for abortions.’”79 The Court upheld the federal regulations on the grounds that they were
part of a program subsidizing medical care, which program the government was under no
constitutional obligation to enact, and which does not deprive women served by the
program of their freedom to seek care outside of the program. In so holding, the Court
reasoned that, while the Constitution prohibits government from depriving individuals of
protected substantive due process rights, it does not obligate them to subsidize the
exercise of those rights. Accordingly, the government was found to have no
constitutional obligation to assure that women served by the federally funded program
were provided with all information necessary for informed medical decision-making.80
Unlike Rust, which addressed the constitutionality of a prohibition on disclosing
certain material treatment information, Casey concerned the constitutionality of a statute
requiring the disclosure of information from doctor to patient. In Casey several abortion
clinics and one physician challenged the constitutionality of provisions of Pennsylvania’s
Abortion Control Act,81 one of which concerned the disclosure of medical information
during the informed consent process. In the case of a patient considering an abortion, the
law required that, in addition to disclosing material treatment information related to risks
and alternatives, a physician must disclose to her patient the probable gestational age of
the patient’s fetus and the risks associated with carrying her fetus to term. It also
required that the physician offer to provide the patient with additional printed materials
published by the state, inform the patient that medical assistance might be available to
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42 U.S.C. sec. 59.8(b)(5).
Rust is a widely criticized opinion. See Robert C. Post, Subsidized Speech, 106 YALE L. J. 151, 168
(1996)(documenting the degree of political controversy and academic criticism toward the opinion).
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See 505 U.S. 833.
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pay for prenatal care, childbirth, and neonatal care, and inform the patient that the
biological father is liable to provide child support. The petitioners claimed that these
requirements violated a woman’s substantive due process right to choose to receive an
abortion.82
The Court upheld the disclosure provisions, and, in the process, it employed a
new standard announced in the opinion: a law violates a woman’s right to choose to have
an abortion when it imposes an “undue burden” on that right. The Court clarified that an
undue burden exists if the law’s “purpose or effect is to place a substantial obstacle in the
path of a woman seeking an abortion before the fetus attains viability.”83 Applying this
standard, the Court found that the required disclosures did not unduly burden a woman’s
right to choose to have an abortion because the information was relevant, truthful and not
misleading.84
While it is difficult to draw hard conclusions from Rust and Casey about whether
or not the Supreme Court would find a substantive due process right to the disclosure of
material treatment information, the cases offer some interesting insights. First, they
suggest that the Constitution does not prohibit governments from regulating the
disclosure of information in the informed consent process whether in the form of
prohibiting the disclosure of material information or requiring the disclosure of particular
information. Second, they indicate that the Constitution probably does not require states
82

See id. at 881-887. Petitioners also argued that the disclosure provisions deprived a woman of her right
to privacy in her relationship with her treating physician. See id. The Court rejected this argument,
reasoning that the doctor-patient relationship in this context does not have a constitutional status
independent of the woman’s right to choose to have an abortion. Instead, whatever constitutional
protection the doctor-patient relationship is entitled to is merely “derivative” of the woman’s right.
Accordingly, the Court found that that relationship “does not underlie or override the two more general
rights under which the abortion right is justified: the right to make family decisions and the right to
physical autonomy.” Id. at 884.
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Id. at 878.
84
See id. at 881-887.
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to assure that patients are provided with treatment information, so long as individuals
have a means to access that information, even if it is a more burdensome means of access
as compared to being provided the information. Finally, they imply that the
constitutionality of a state’s disclosure law would be determined based on whether it
places a substantial obstacle in the path of a patient’s exercising her right to consent to or
refuse offered treatment, and, in the context of disclosure practices, that analysis would
likely turn on whether those practices would result in treatment decisions based on fraud
or coercion.
The foregoing analysis of Cruzan, Glucksberg, Rust, and Casey suggest that
White’s claimed right to treatment information reasonably necessary to informed
decision-making suffers from several doctrinal flaws. First and most fundamentally, it
fails to recognize that the right to refuse treatment information is more modest than a
right to autonomous medical decision-making, protecting only against a battery. Second,
while a right to avoid an unwanted medical intrusion of the body likely implies a right to
know the invasive nature of the treatment, it does not necessarily give rise to a right to
know all material information about the treatment. Information about a patient’s medical
condition, her prognosis with and without treatment, the risks of a proposed treatment,
and the risks of alternatives to the proposed treatment is all valuable to autonomous
medical decision-making. The traditions and practices of state informed consent law,
however, do not establish that the absence of such information invalidates an individual’s
consent to the invasion accompanied by treatment. In fact, quite the opposite is true.85
Accordingly, it is very difficult to justify constitutional protection for a right to know all
material treatment information based on a fundamental right to refuse a medical invasion
85

See supra notes 49 through 56 and the accompanying text.
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of the body, and it is equally difficult to argue that the lack of such information places an
undue burden on the right to refuse such a bodily invasion. Third, even a constitutional
right to know the invasive nature of a proposed treatment does not translate into a right to
have a health care provider volunteer that information. Instead, it is more likely a right to
receive truthful and non-misleading answers to questions about the invasive nature of the
treatment. Certainly, it might be easier and more befitting of a patient’s lack of medical
expertise for a state’s laws to require that physicians provide such information without
being asked. Placing the burden on a patient to inquire about the invasiveness of a
proposed treatment, however, is not likely to be deemed “undue” because it provides a
reasonable means of access to the information and therefore does not place a substantial
obstacle in the path of a patient seeking to exercise her right to the information or her
right to refuse the bodily intrusion of a proposed treatment.
C.

Alternatives for Recognizing a Prisoner’s Right to Receive the
Disclosure of Material Treatment Information

Protecting the interests of prisoners in receiving the disclosure of material
treatment information as part of the informed consent process for any medical care they
receive while incarcerated is important. Indeed, the importance of that interest may have
been what motivated the Third Circuit’s effort in White to derive a right to such
disclosure from the right to be free of unwanted bodily invasions under the Fourteenth
Amendment. Yet, as described above, White is doctrinally flawed and therefore
constitutionally suspect. Accordingly, the interest of prisoners in receiving sufficient
information to make informed treatment decisions is in jeopardy unless one or more
alternatives exist for prisoners to enforce a right to the disclosure of material treatment
information. This section identifies some possible alternatives. While it is beyond the
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scope of this Article to analyze each alternative in detail, this section describes a
sufficient number of alternatives to establish that the right described in White is not
necessary in the effort to protect a prisoner’s informed consent rights.
One such an alternative might be a Section 1983 claim enforcing the state’s
obligation to provide for the medical care of those it incarcerates or otherwise holds in
custody. This duty was articulated by the U.S. Supreme Court in Estelle v. Gamble,
which held that “deliberate indifference to the serious medical needs of prisoners
constitutes the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain’ . . . proscribed by the Eighth
Amendment.”86 The same duty has been found to arise out of the Fourteenth
Amendment for individuals held in state custody but not incarcerated.87
The logic underlying the constitutional obligation of states to provide for the
medical needs of those they hold in custody is based on the reality that those held in
custody are unable to provide for their own needs, including their own medical needs. As
one commentator put it:
At the most simple level, an inmate cannot self-treat by calling in sick, changing a
diet, or purchasing and using simple remedies such as aspirin, cold pills, laxatives,
or bandages. More significantly, the inmate cannot choose a doctor or form of
treatment. Because in mates cannot go to the emergency room of a local hospital,
inmates will have medical needs that must be met on an emergency basis and
around the clock. Prohibitions on the individual possession of drugs or medical
devices, in addition to other security restrictions regulating medical care, result in
the need for constant medical care.88
Case law has not adequately addressed whether a failure to disclose material
treatment information is actionable as a violation of the Eighth Amendment duty for the
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429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976).
See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979) (pretrial detainee).
MICHAEL B. MUSHLIN, RIGHTS OF PRISONERS 355-356 (section 3:1) (3d ed. 2002).
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State to provide for the medical needs of those it holds in custody.89 Yet, the condition of
dependence that justifies the obligation of the state to provide treatment appears broad
enough to encompass such a disclosure duty owed by the State to prisoners. In addition
to lacking the expertise to know the risks of and alternatives to a treatment, prisoners also
lack the ability to obtain such information easily on their own through research or by
asking for information from other patients or other health care professionals. Just as the
state is the prisoner’s only source for medical care, it is also the prisoner’s source for
information about proposed medical care.
Re-articulating the right to receive the disclosure of material treatment
information as founded on the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment obligation of the state
to provide medical care to those the state holds in custody avoids the primary weakness
of the right as conceived under White. It need not be derived from a right to be free of
unwanted bodily invasions. Instead, it allows for a court to reason from a pre-existing
89

While no cases directly address this question, a few touch upon it indirectly, sending mixed signals as to
the viability of an Eighth Amendment claim. For example, in Riddick v. Modeny, 250 Fed.Appx. 482, 2007
WL 2980186 (3rd Cir. 2007), a prisoner complained that prison doctors failed to provide him with
medication he requested and instead prescribed a different medication that burned the prisoner’s skin. The
prisoner claimed a violation of the Eighth Amendment duty to address the prisoner’s medical needs,
alleging that the doctors violated the duty by failing to provide the requested medication, by delaying the
time of treatment be a couple of days, and by failing to warn the prisoner of he risk of burns associated with
the medication that was prescribed. The Third Circuit upheld a lower court dismissal of the prisoner’s
complaint for failure to state a cognizable claim. The Court reasoned that the doctors could not be found
deliberately indifferent to the prisoner’s medical needs even though they may have been negligent in their
choice of medication, noting that the Eighth Amendment duty should not be used to address acts of medical
malpractice. Although Riddick does not specifically address the failure-to-warn claim, it could be
interpreted to implicitly reject such a claim if one were to interpret a failure to warn as an act of
professional negligence. On the other hand, the Second Circuit, in Hathaway v. Coughlin, 37 F.3d 63
(1994), held that a viable Eighth Amendment claim was stated by a prisoner claiming that adequate
treatment of his hip pain was delayed for such a long period of time after the defendant doctor knew – but
did not disclose – that the pain could have been caused by broken pins inserted in an earlier surgery as to
amount to deliberate indifference to the prisoner’s medical needs. In holding that a reasonable juror could
find that the physician was deliberately indifferent, the Court specifically relied on the physician’s failure
to disclose to the prisoner the potential cause of his hip pain. Additionally, two other cases dismissed
Eighth Amendment claims by prisoners, which were based on a failure to disclose material treatment
information, but the dismissals were based on a failure to establish any injury rather than a non-cognizable
duty to disclose such information under the Eighth Amendment. See Abdush-Shahid, 933 F.Supp. 168
(1996); Ieng v. Fleck, 2000 WL 1593397 (9th Cir. 2000).
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duty to provide medical care. Another advantage of basing the right on the state’s
obligation to provide for the medical needs of those it holds in custody is that the right is
more clearly limited to cases involving prisoners and others held in state custody.
While a prisoner’s right to the disclosure of material treatment information seems
to find support in the Eighth Amendment duty of the state to attend to the medical needs
of those it holds in custody, the claim remains untested.90 Nonetheless, options remain
for prisoners to enforce such a disclosure right. For example, prisoners may have a cause
of action based on state law claims for medical malpractice and negligence.91
Additionally, a prisoner may claim a violation of a state statute, regulation, or policy that
requires prisons to provide adequate medical care to prisoners.92 Prisoners may also
bring claims under the Federal Torts Claims Act.93, 94
Given these possible alternatives to substantive due process right to the disclosure
material treatment information, the right announced in White is unnecessary. As
90

See id.
See, e.g., Moore v. State, No. W2008-02699-COA-R3-CV, 2009 WL 4932203 (Tenn. Ct. App., Dec. 23,
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explained in the next section, an added benefit relying on those alternatives and
overturning the substantive due process right announced in White is that it avoids the
threat that White and its progeny pose to state informed consent law.

III. Implications of a Constitutional Right to Treatment Information for State Law
The substantive due process right recognized in White to receive the disclosure of
treatment information overlaps significantly with the typical right to receive treatment
information enforced through states’ informed consent liability standards. Consequently,
the right will substantial affect state informed consent law, at least whenever state action
is present. This is because the right sets a constitutional floor for disclosure that is in
close proximity to prevailing state liability standards, and it does so on the basis of a right
to refuse treatment, which is shared by all individuals. Thus, unless the right’s
applicability is limited to circumstances in which the patient is held in government
custody, it threatens to alter state liability standards, inject the politics of substantive due
process into the interpretation of state informed consent law, and undermine the
prerogative of each state to regulate the medical profession as it sees fit.
This section begins with a brief explanation of why the state action doctrine will
not prevent the application of the constitutional right recognized in White and later cases
in informed consent claims outside of the prison context where disclosure standards
under state law normally control.
A.

State Action as an Incomplete Barrier to the Application of White in
State Informed Consent Cases

To appreciate how the constitutional right recognized in White and its progeny
might threaten state informed consent law, it is necessary to understand that the state
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action doctrine cannot provide a reliable barrier between that constitutional right and
states’ informed consent disclosure standards. First state actors are defendants in many
informed consent cases. While most often medical care and informed consent takes place
in the context of a private treatment relationship, care is often provided by a physician
acting on behalf of the government. Examples include care provided by a health care
professional employed by the Veterans Administration, the Public Health Service, an
Indian Health Service Hospital, or a state or local public hospital.95 A non-scientific
review of all informed consent opinions published in 2008 and 2009 suggests that about
twelve percent of cases decided in those years involve a state actor as a defendant.96
Second, state action might be satisfied even in the case of private providers where
care takes place in a jurisdiction with a significant statutory or regulatory structure for
concerning informed consent. Texas and Louisiana provide extreme examples; no state
governments are more entangled in the informed consent process between doctors and
patients.
A Texas statute creates a state-sponsored “medical disclosure panel” whose job it
is to review all medical procedures and sort them onto one of two official lists: those for
which risks must be disclosed (known as “List A” procedures) and those for which no
risk disclosure is required (known as “List B” procedures).97 For List A procedures, the

95

See e.g., Frantz v. U.S., 29 F.3d 222 (5th Cir. 1994) (claim for treatment at VA hospital); Borosavage v.
U.S., 667 F.Supp.2d 208 (D. Mass. 2009)(claims against VA hospital physician); Santistevan v. U.S., 610
F.Supp.2d 1036 (D.S.D. 2009) (claim against physician employed by a federal Indian Health Services
Hospital); Leab v. Chambersburg Hosp., 230 F.R.D 395 (M.D.Pa. 2005)(claim against employee of the
federal Public Health Service); Valazquez ex rel. Segarra v. City of New York Health and Hospitals Corp.
(Jacobi Medical Center), 894 N.Y.S.2d 15 (2010) (action brought against public hospital in New York
City).
96
I entered the search HE (“informed consent” /p (physician doctor medic!)) and DA (2009 2008) into the
WESTLAW “allcases” database. One hundred nineteen opinions were returned, and, of those, fifteen
involved a state actor as a defendant.
97
See V.T.C.A Civ Prac & Rem Code section 74.103.
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Panel also identifies and publishes the risks that must be disclosed.98 A physician
proposing that a patient consent a List A procedure is obligated to disclose the risks
identified by the Panel and only those risks, and the physician can disclose those risks by
merely handing to the patient the risk disclosures created by the Panel.99 By providing
those disclosures and obtaining the patient’s consent in writing, a physician triggers a
presumption that she has fulfilled her disclosure duty,100 which can only be rebutted by a
showing of fraud or incapacity of the patient.101 Likewise, a physician who does not
disclose treatment risks of a List B procedure is entitled to a rebuttable presumption that
she has fulfilled her disclosure duty.102
A very similar system exists in Louisiana except that the Secretary of the
Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals, rather than a specially created disclosure
panel.103 As in Texas, the lists of disclosures are published in the state administrative
code.104 Unlike the Texas statute, Louisiana’s informed consent statute does not require
that physicians disclose at least those risks identified by this administrative process.
Rather, it permits physicians to identify and provide the appropriate disclosures on their
98

See id.
See Earle v. Ratliff, 998 S.W.2d 882, 891-892 (Tx. 1999) (physician who discloses all of the risks
identified by the Medical Disclosure Panel for a List A procedure cannot be found negligent for failing to
disclose other risks of the procedure).
100
See supra note 97, at section 74.106 (a)(1).
101
See Earle v. Ratliff, 998 S.W.2d 882, 891-892.
102
See supra note 97. Because the issue has not been addressed by a Texas court, it is unclear how such a
presumption could be rebutted. Given that the risks listed for a List A procedure are the only risks that a
physician is obligated to disclose, which leaves a plaintiff with only the strategy of attaching the validity of
the consent, see Earle v. Ratliff, supra note 99, it seems likely that a court would not permit a plaintiff to
rebut the presumption that the physician was not obligated to disclose any treatment risks for a List B
procedure with evidence of the treatment risks associated with that procedure, again leaving the plaintiff
with only the strategy of rebutting the consent. In short, the presumption appears to be conclusive with
respect to fulfillment of the duty to disclose.
103
See Louisiana Rev. Stat. sec. 40:1299.40. Although the Louisiana Secretary of Health and Hospitals
has responsibility for the system today, Louisiana originally relied on a medical disclosure panel when it
first began to codify informed consent risk disclosure. A 2008 state law reassigned the responsibilities of
the panel to the Secretary of Health and Hospitals. See the historical notes to Louisiana Rev. Stat. sec.
40:1299.40.
104
See 48 Louisiana Admin. Code Pt. 1, sections 2301-2463.
99
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own or to use the disclosures identified and published by the Secretary.105 Yet, the
statute provides a powerful incentive to rely on the state-created disclosure lists. A
physician who provides to a patient the disclosures identified by the Louisiana Secretary
of Health and Hospitals for the treatment at issue is entitled to a rebuttable presumption
that she has satisfied her legal duty to provide material treatment information to the
patient prior to seeking consent to treatment.106
Based on these regulatory structures, a compelling argument can be made that
state action exists in most informed consent cases in Texas and Louisiana. According to
U.S. Supreme Court precedent, state action exists where “there is such a ‘close nexus
between the State and the challenged action’ that seemingly private behavior ‘may be
fairly treated as that of the State itself.’”107 This includes circumstances where private
actors pursue state sanctioned private remedies using “state procedures with the overt,
significant assistance of state officials . . . .”108 So, for example, the Supreme Court has
held that state action exists where a state court named a private executor over a private
estate according to state probate procedures.109 Likewise, the Court has found state
action where a state court clerk, pursuant to a state statute, issued a writ of attachment in
a private debt collection action, which writ was executed by a sheriff.110
Using these standards, a plaintiff in an informed consent claim could argue
credibly that state action exists when her private physician relied on the work of the
disclosure panel (in Texas) or the Secretary of Health and Hospitals (in Louisiana) to

105
106
107
108
109
110

See Louisiana Rev. Stat. sec. 40:1299.40E(2)(b).
See id. 40:1299.40E(7)(a)(i).
Brentwood Academy v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288, 295 (2001).
Tulsa Professional Collection Services, Inc. v. Pope, 108 S. Ct. 1340, 1345 (1988).
See Id.
See Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 2744 (1982).
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satisfy her disclosure obligations to the plaintiff. Imagine, for example, private
physicians, relying on the presumptions of non-liability promised under both states’ laws,
disclose the risks of proposed treatments to patients by handing over the lists of risks
created by an administrative agency. In each case, the physician uses a state-created
procedure to gain a presumption of non-liability, and they do so with the assistance of the
work product of a state agency. Moreover, the assistance to those physicians by Texas or
Louisiana is significant because the state has determined for each physician what, if any,
treatment information to disclose to their patients. Outside of Texas or Louisiana, those
determinations are made unaided by private physicians.
While Texas and Louisiana are unique in their administrative determination of
informed consent disclosures, other states employ a more common procedure of requiring
public review panels to certify the authenticity of private malpractice claims before those
claims may be filed in court.111 Still other states make a review by such a public panel
available at the discretion of a state court judge or upon the request of either party to a
malpractice claim, and those states make the panel’s findings admissible in court as
presumptive evidence of negligence or non-negligence.112 Again, these procedures give
rise to a credible claim of state action. In each instance a private party is making use of
state procedures for the resolution of a private dispute with the overt and significant
assistance of a state-created panel.
Because informed consent cases regularly arise that involve a state actor and are
outside of the prison context, and because agencies in many states are directly involved in

111

See e.g., Indiana (Ind. Code sec 34-18-8-4(1)), Louisiana (LSA-R.S. sec 40:1299.47B(1)(a)(i)),
Nebraska (Neb. Rev. St. sec 44-2840).
112
See e.g., Florida (F.S.A sec 766.107); Kansas (K.S.A. sec 65-4901), New Hampshire (N.H. Rev. Stat.
sec. 519-B:8), Delaware (18 Del.C. sec 6812).
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the regulation or resolution of informed consent claims, we should expect that the
substantive due process right to the disclosure of material treatment information as
articulated in White will come into play.113 It will be available in some cases to trump
state disclosure standards, which, as described more fully below, could alter state law
significantly. That would result in two different disclosure standards operating in a
jurisdiction at once: one for cases involving state action and one for all other cases.
Given the complexities of the state action doctrine, this would undoubtedly add
significant confusion to a state’s informed consent law and muddy any behavioral signal
the law might otherwise send to health care professionals.
B.

How White and Its Progeny Might Invade State Informed Consent Law

While informed consent law varies from state to state, there are several common
attributes.114 The doctrine imposes two duties on physicians: a duty to refrain from
providing medical care to a patient without the patient’s consent, and a duty to disclose
material information about a proposed treatment to a patient prior to seeking the patient’s
consent. An injurious breach of either duty gives rise to a cause of action, but the nature
of the claim (and the remedy) depends on which duty is breached. Harm caused by a
breach of the duty to refrain from treating a patient without her consent is remedied
through a battery action, which recognizes the treatment itself as a compensable harm.
The duty does not apply in the case of an emergency where consent to stabilizing
treatment is presumed. Battery claims for medical treatment are rare; when filed, they

113

An interesting question is whether a constitutional standard for disclosure would influence state law
even in the absence of state action. For example, a court might rely on the constitutional standard as
persuasive authority for how to interpret state informed consent law in a dispute among private actors.
114
For in-depth analysis of the history, ethics and law of informed consent, see FADEN AND BEAUCHAMP,
JESSICA W. BERG ET AL., INFORMED CONSENT: LEGAL THEORY AND CLINICAL PRACTICE (2d ed. 2001); Jay
KATZ, THE SILENT WORLD OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT (1984).
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typically allege that a physician exceeded the scope of the consent provided by the
patient.
Far more common are claims for the breach of the duty to disclose material
information. Such a claim arises when a patient has consented to a treatment but alleges
that her consent was insufficiently informed because of the physician’s failure to disclose
relevant information. Except in Pennsylvania, such claims are brought under a
professional negligence theory.115 While all states require the disclosure of material
information, they employ different standards of materiality. Nearly half of all states use
the reasonable person standard, which defines material information as that which a
reasonable person, in what the physician knows or should know to be the patient’s
position, would consider relevant to the treatment decision at issue.116 The other states
use the prudent physician standard, which defines material information as that which a
reasonably prudent physician, in the same or similar clinical circumstances, would
disclose.117 There are several exceptions to the duty to disclose.118 A physician is
obligated to disclose neither treatment risks that are too remote when considered in light
of the severity of harm nor risks that are already known to the particular patient or to
laypersons generally. Nor must a physician disclose treatment information to a patient
suffering from an emergency, or where the patient waives her right to such disclosures, or
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See e.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir 1972). Fraud in obtaining a patient’s consent to
treatment is an exception. Where proven, the fraud negates the patient’s consent and gives rise to a battery
claim. See FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW: CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 282-283 (6th ed. 2008).
Pennsylvania law is unique. Rather than remedy negligent disclosure through a professional negligence
claim and fraud in obtaining consent through a battery claim, it relies on a battery action for all claims
related to informed consent, including negligent failure to disclose material information. See [PA case].
116
See e.g., Canterbury, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir 1972).
117
See FURROW ET AL, supra note 115 at 240 (reporting that a “slight majority” of jurisdictions have
adopted the prudent physician standard and citing to examples).
118
See MARK A. HALL, MARY ANNE BOBINSKI & DAVID ORENTLICHER, HEALTH CARE LAW AND ETHICS
220 (7th ed. 2007).
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where the physician determines, based on “sound medical judgment[,] that
communication of . . . risk information would present a threat to the patient’s wellbeing.”119
Regardless of the standard for disclosure, all states require the plaintiff to
establish “decision-causation,” meaning that the failure to disclose information caused
the treatment decision.120 A few states permit a subjective standard for decisioncausation, asking whether the plaintiff herself would have refused the treatment had the
undisclosed information been revealed.121 The vast majority of jurisdictions, however,
reject the subjective standard out of concern that it would saddle fact-finders with
prejudicial testimony from sympathetic plaintiffs with the benefit if hindsight. Instead,
they employ an objective standard for decision-causation: whether a reasonable person,
in the patient’s position and armed with the undisclosed information, would have refused
the treatment.122 In addition to requiring proof of decision-causation, all states require
that plaintiffs establish that the treatment resulted in a bad outcome attributable to the
undisclosed information.123 So, for example, a plaintiff claiming that her physician failed
to disclose a material risk of infection associated with a procedure to which she consented
must prove not only that a reasonable person in her position would not have consented to
the procedure had the risk of infection been disclosed, but also that the risk actually
materialized in her case causing her harm. Unlike battery claims for failure to refrain
from treatment absent consent, negligence claims for failure to disclose material

119

Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 789.
See e.g., Canterbury, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir 1972).
121
See e.g., Error! Main Document Only.40 Pa.Stat. § 1303.504(d); Scott v. Bradford, 606 P.2d
554 (1980).
122
See id.
123
See e.g., Canterbury, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir 1972).
120
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information do not recognize the treatment itself as a compensable harm. Instead,
damages are limited to harm caused by the undisclosed risk that materialized in the
patient’s treatment.124
While informed consent law is generally well settled in each state, controversies
remain about how to interpret and apply the law. Additionally, there are important
differences among the states both as to the standards employed and how those standards
are applied in a particular case. A constitutional “right to such information as is
reasonably necessary to make an informed decision to accept or reject proposed
treatment,”125 including “a reasonable explanation of the viable alternative treatments . .
.”126 has substantial implications for these controversies and differences.
Consider, for example, a garden-variety claim that a physician failed to disclose a
treatment risk prior to the patient’s consenting to and receiving the treatment. The
process of determining whether the defendant-physician breached a duty to disclose
material information by failing to disclose this risk information calls for several legal and
factual judgments, which, if made in such a way as to deny recovery to the plaintiffpatient, could be challenged as violating the patient’s substantive due process right to
information “reasonably necessary” to an informed treatment decision, at least in cases
where state action exists. The first of these judgments is – in jurisdictions applying the
prudent physician standard of materiality – to determine the “clinical circumstances” in
which to place the reasonably prudent physician so as to assess what that objectified
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See BERG ET AL supra note 114 at 134, 141. The underlying logic is that a negligent failure to disclose
material treatment information does not negate the consent provided by the patient, but it works an estoppel
against a physician’s claiming that the patient, through her consent to treatment, assumed responsibility for
the undisclosed risk and the harm that resulted when that risk materialized in her case.
125
White, 897 F.2d 103, 113.
126
Id.
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physician would disclose, or – in a jurisdiction applying the reasonable person standard
of materiality – it is the determination of the “patient’s position” into which is placed the
reasonable person so as to assess what that objectified person would consider significant
to the treatment decision at hand.127 Whether and to what extent “clinical circumstance”
or “patient’s position” includes idiosyncratic attributes of the patient (her goals for
treatment, her level of risk aversion, her religious beliefs, etc) beyond her diagnosis and
the treatment her physician has recommended significantly affects whether the
undisclosed risk will be deemed “material” under state law and thus subject to
disclosure.128 The fewer idiosyncracies accounted for in a state court decision, the more
likely that the decision can be challenged as an unconstitutional deprivation of the right to
information reasonably necessary to enable the patient to make an informed treatment
decision. Then there is the determination of materiality itself. A state court verdict based
on a determination that certain risk information was not material could be challenged as
violative of the constitutional right to information reasonably necessary for an informed
decision. State court decisions finding that risk information need not be disclosed
because the risk is “remote” or “common knowledge” among laypersons would be
subject to similar challenge.129

127

See Robert Gatter, Informed Consent and the Forgotten Duty of Physician Inquiry, 31 LOY. U. CHI.
L.J. 557 (2000) (arguing that the starting place in the application of either objective standard of materiality
is to determine which subjective attributes of the patient must be accounted for in the objective test and
which subjective attributes may be disregarded).
128
See id.
129
The challenge would likely occur as part of an appeal of any case in which the plaintiff lost at trial.
Whether targeting the state trial court’s determination as a matter of law that a particular undisclosed risk
was immaterial under the state’s prevailing disclosure standard or too remote, or the state court’s jury
instructions concerning the standard for disclosure or remoteness, or the state court’s reliance on a jury
verdict to dispose of the case, the losing plaintiff would challenge the trial court’s actions as a deprivation
of a substantive liberty interest without due process of law pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment. See
e.g., [cite]. Additionally, a losing plaintiff might challenge a state court decision on procedural due process
grounds, arguing that state law must is procedurally defective to the extent that it does not assess whether
risk information found to be immaterial under state law is nonetheless “reasonably necessary” to an
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Additional constitutional challenges could result concerning matters over which
states are split if White is correct that a substantive due process right exists for individuals
to receive information reasonably necessary to make informed treatment decisions. For
example, states are split as to whether information concerning the treating physician (e.g.,
her level of experience with a particular procedure, her history of alcohol or drug abuse,
or her financial conflicts of interest) constitutes material information that must be
disclosed.130 Where state action exists, a ruling that such information is not material
potentially violates a right to information reasonably necessary to informed treatment
decisions. More fundamentally, states are split over whether to measure the sufficiency
of disclosures from the perspective of a prudent physician (treating disclosures as a
matter of medical expertise) or whether to do so from the perspective of a reasonable
person (treating disclosures as a matter of personal values).131 The use of the prudent
physician standard could be challenged as violating a constitutional right to information
reasonably necessary to informed decision-making to the extent that it results in
permitting fewer disclosures than would a standard that requires the fact-finder to assess
the necessity of information from the perspective of laypersons who must ultimately
make the treatment decisions.132

informed treatment decision pursuant to White. See e.g., Zinernon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113 (1990)
(challenging the application in his case of a state policy and procedure for involuntary commitment by staff
members at a state mental hospital, and resulting in a determination that those procedures were inadequate
to satisfy procedural due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment).
130
See e.g., Johnson v. Kokemoor, 545 N.W.2d 495 (Wis. 1996) (recognizing a duty to disclose lack of
experience with a particular procedure); Duttry v. Patterson, 771 A.2d 1255 (Pa. 2001) (state law does not
require a physician to disclose personal characteristics or experience); Hidding v. Williams, 578 So.2d
1192 (La.App.1991) (physician’s failure to disclose chronic alcoholism violates state informed consent
law); Albany Urology Clinic, P.C. v. Cleveland, 528 S.E.2d 777 (Ga. 2000) (no obligation to disclose drug
use under state informed consent law).
131
See supra notes 116 and 117 and the accompanying text.
132
Although the Court in Canterbury was not addressing a constitutional claim, it outlined the logic that
might lead a court to conclude that constitutional right to information that is reasonably necessary to
informed decision-making requires a disclosure standard that considers the value of information from the
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The foregoing describes how readily common state law questions about the
proper scope of disclosure requirements can become constitutional questions, at least
when there is state action. The more this occurs, the larger questions of federalism will
loom.
The more influential a federal constitutional standard becomes, the more we risk
losing the heterogeneity of approaches to disclosure laws we enjoy today.133 To be clear,
the diversity of approaches reflects more than just different ways to enforce the same
norms; it reflects normative differences as well.
Informed consent law is perceived to be at the heart of the doctor-patient
relationship.134 Accordingly, it reveals a normative viewpoint of that relationship, and its
ongoing application to cases offers the opportunity to publicly reaffirm or amend that
viewpoint. Thus, some states may take the view that the doctor-patient relationship is a
fiduciary one and that this justifies a standard of disclosure obligating physicians to
reveal not only material information about a treatment but also material information
about themselves to their patients.135 Meanwhile, another State might conceive of the
doctor-patient relationship as something akin to an arms-length relationship in a
specialized market, and that disclosure rules provide an incentive for physicians to at
perspective of the layperson who has the right to make that decision. “[T]he patient’s right of self-decision
shapes the boundaries of the duty to reveal. That right can be effectively exercised only if the patient
possesses enough information to enable an intelligent choice. The scope f the physician’s communications
to the patient, then , must be measured by the patient’s need, and that need is the information material to the
decision.” 464 F.2d at 786.
133
See generally Elaine W. Shoben, Uncommon Law and the Bill of Rights: The Woes of
Constitutionalizing State Common-Law Torts, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 173 (1992).
134
See Robert Gatter, The Mysterious Survival of the Policy Against Informed Consent Liability for
Hospitals, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1203, 1264-66 (2006) (arguing that the reason courts resist imposing
informed consent liability on hospitals is because of an unarticulated sense that to do so would disrupt a
delicate and intimate moment that sustains trust in the doctor-patient relationship).
135
See Mark A. Hall, Law, Medicine and Trust, 55 STANFORD L. REV. 463, 487-90 (2002) (arguing that
informed consent law is a quintessential example of a syllogistic stance with respect to health law and trust:
because the doctor-patient relationship is or should be a relationship of trust, then physicians have a
fiduciary obligation to disclose information and seek consent prior to treatment).
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least warn patients of potential hazards in proposed treatments and options for avoiding
those hazards. As a result, the disclosure rules in that state might not be interpreted to
require the disclosure of information about the physician. A substantive due process right
to the disclosure of material treatment information could significantly diminish the
opportunity to articulate and reassess the normative viewpoints that underlie informed
consent law. Yet, the normative differences revealed in state law today would not
disappear as a result. Rather, they would exist but informed consent law would be less
likely to reflect those differences, which could have a destabilizing effect on informed
consent law.
This is consistent with current conceptions of health law generally. A persistent
theme among those who seek cohesive principles for health law is that such principles
may be out of reach unless normative clashes are better articulated and resolved at least
within particular topical spheres where health law operates.136 If accurate, this
description of the state of health law as a coherent field counsels in favor of allowing
states to conduct the interpretive work on disclosure rules as much as possible.
The issue goes beyond concerns about federalizing disclosure law and includes
concerns implicated by “constitutionalizing” disclosure law through substantive due
process. Recognizing an individual’s interest in receiving all information reasonably
necessary to informed medical decision-making as a fundamental liberty interest would
not only push debate about the normative underpinnings of disclosure laws out of public
arenas other than federal courts, it would also redefine those debates in terms of liberty
and self-determination. Other normative issues that combine with the value of respect for
136

See e.g., M. Gregg Bloche, The Invention of Health Law, 91 CAL. L. REV. 247 (2003); William M.
Sage, Relational Duties, Regulatory Duties, and the Widening Gap Between Individual Health Law and
Collective Health Policy, 96 GEO. L.J. 497 (2008).
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individual liberty to develop a disclosure rule for liability purposes would be largely
stripped away. These include the assignment of responsibility for risks of treatment
between doctor and patient, fair compensation to those injured as a result of professional
negligence, protection of physicians from liability based on a bad outcome rather than
professional negligence, and, as described above, promotion of a shared normative view
of the doctor-patient relationship.137 Rule-making that fails to account adequately for all
of these issues may result in rules that are impractical or that lack public support because
they express a norm of self-determination at the expense of other concerns with which
rules of liability must contend.
Additionally, the more state informed consent law is subject to the information
disclosure rule under White, the more it is subject to the unique politics of substantive due
process jurisprudence. Whether the guarantee of due process in the federal Constitution
gives rise to any substantive rights and, if so, what rights is deeply controversial and
closely linked to the politics of judicial activism, separation of powers, and federalism.138
Moreover, substantive due process is tied inexorably to the hot-button topics of privacy,
abortion, physician-assisted suicide, refusing life-sustaining medical care, and
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See Alexander Morgan Capron, Informed Consent in Catastrophic Disease Research and Treatment,
123 U. Penn L. Rev. 340, 365-376 (1974) (describing the several functions of informed consent law to
include protecting patient autonomy, encouraging reflection by physicians and rationality by patients in
medical decision-making, and involving the public generally in medicine).
138
See Patrick M. Garry, A Different Model for the Right to Privacy: The Political Question Doctrine as a
Substitute for Substantive Due Process, 61 U. MIAMI L. REV. 169 (2006); James W. Ely, Jr., The Oxymoron
Reconsidered: Myth and Reality in the Origins of Substantive Due Process, 16 CONST. COM. 315, 315
(1999) (substantive due process is politically contentious doctrine); ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF
AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 31 (1990) (describing substantive due process as a
“sham”); Rosalie Berger Levinson, Reining In Abuses of Executive Power Through Substantive Due
Process, 60 FLA. L. REV. 519, 521 (describing substantive due process as “one of the most . . . controversial
areas of constitutional” because of its protection of “contentious non-textual rights” and the issues it raises
“regarding the proper role of the judiciary in reviewing the actions of other branches of government . . . .”);
Randy E. Barnett, Scrutiny Land, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1479 (2008)(addressing the problems of judicial
activism associated with various standards for identifying substantive rights protected under the due
process clause).
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homosexuality.139 This, in turn, has implications for how disputes are resolved through
substantive due process. Thus, when the U.S. Supreme Court holds that the Constitution
does not protect a liberty interest in physician-assisted suicide, it must carefully
distinguish an interest in assisted suicide from an interest in avoiding a medical battery.140
Similarly, the Court must distinguish between concepts of autonomy on the one hand,
which were referenced in opinions protecting against unduly burdensome abortion
restrictions and yet given no weight in an opinion on physician-assisted suicide, and
concepts of tradition and liberty that justify a right to refuse unwanted life-sustaining
treatments.141 Moreover, this explains why activists for reproductive rights find it
necessary to support a constitutional challenge to state prohibitions on physician assisted
suicide.142 Accordingly, one risk of the substantive due process right articulated in White
is that the shadow issues of judicial activism, privacy and abortion will predominate its
application to state informed consent law, confusing other important political
considerations or even crowding them out completely.
Thus, there is cause for concern that a substantive due process right to material
treatment information as articulated in White will invade, distort, and destabilize
disclosure rules in state informed consent law. This, in turn, leads to the conclusion that
a narrow interpretation of the right to refuse treatment and any derivative right to
information is the better interpretation and not just the more doctrinally sound
interpretation. It also provides an additional reason to protect the interest of prisoners to
139

See Yale Kamisar, Can Glucksberg Survive Lawrence? Another Look at the End of Life and Personal
Autonomy, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1453, 1456-7 (2008)(recognizing the link between substantive due process,
privacy and sexuality); Levinson, supra note 138; Susan Frelich Appleton, Assisted Suicide and
Reproductive Freedom: Exploring Some Connections, 76 WASH. U. L. Q. 15 (1998) (recognizing the
political and potential legal links between rights to physician assisted suicide and abortion).
140
See supra notes 65 and 66 and the accompanying text.
141
See supra notes 66 and 67 and the accompanying text.
142
See Appelton, supra note 139, at 15.
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receive material treatment information through some mechanism other than the right
articulated in White.143
C.

White is Not Necessary to Correct the Most Inadequate State
Disclosure Standards

Of course, some states have grossly inadequate disclosure standards, including
those in Georgia, Pennsylvania and Texas. Remedying those inadequacies is the best
argument for a broadly applicable constitutional right to the disclosure of material
treatment information as articulated in White. Yet, as discussed below, it is not a
sufficient argument because there are other ways to address those inadequacies.
In Georgia, a statute grants individuals the right to be provided with material
treatment information, including risk information and alternatives, if and when they are
considering a surgical procedure that would be provided under general, spinal or regional
anesthesia or if they are considering whether to consent to amniocentesis or any
diagnostic procedure involving the injection of intravenous or intraductal contrast
material.144 The statute does not address whether the disclosures required for the listed
procedures are also required for other non-listed procedures.145 The Court of Appeals of
Georgia twice ruled that the statute does not preclude a common law duty for physicians
to disclose material treatment information to patients that applies beyond the limited
clinical circumstances described in the statute.146 In 2009, however, the Supreme Court
of Georgia overruled those two opinions, holding that the statute imposes a duty to
disclose material treatment information only in those limited circumstances and that it
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prohibits courts from recognizing a common law duty to disclosure beyond the limited
duty recognized in the statute.147 What results is an absurdly unfair disclosure regime in
which patients have a right to the disclosure of the risks of surgery, but not the risks of
prescription medications or of a chiropractic manipulation. Certainly, a substantive due
process right to the disclosure of material treatment information, which applies to all
treatments, could be used to invalidate the Georgia statute and to enforce disclosure
across all treatments.148
Pennsylvania enforces a duty to disclose material information, but – as in Georgia
– it does so only in the case of certain procedures listed in a state statute.149 These
include surgery, the use of anesthesia for surgery, radiation, chemotherapy, blood
transfusions, inserting a surgical devise or appliance, the administration of an
experimental drug or an approved drug in an experimental manner, and the
administration of an experimental device or an approved device in an experimental
manner.150 As a result, Pennsylvania courts have dismissed claims brought by patients
alleging that their physicians failed to disclose material treatment information where the
treatments at issue do not appear on the statutory list.151 Thus, Pennsylvania law is as
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absurd as the law in Georgia, enforcing a right to receive treatment information for only
some kinds of medical care.
Texas informed consent law, described earlier, also imposes a duty of disclosure
on physicians with respect to some procedures, but not others. Every procedure is
categorized by an administrative panel as either a procedure for which risk disclosures
are required (known as a “List A” procedure) or a procedure for which no risk disclosure
is required (known as a “List B” procedure).152 Even a cursory review of List B
procedures reveals several highly invasive procedures that almost certainly have
significant risks associated with them: appendectomy, colonoscopy, and breast and lung
biopsies are just a few examples.153 Yet, Texas law does not impose a duty to disclose
any risk information to patients considering those procedures.
It is tempting to embrace White’s constitutional right to the disclosure of all
information reasonably necessary to make informed treatment decisions when confronted
with the woefully inadequate standards in Georgia, Pennsylvania and Texas. Such a right
could invalidate laws that fall below a national standard articulated in White, at least
whenever state action is present. Yet, as argued above, doing so comes at a price. A
substantive due process right is a powerful and blunt legal tool that is ill-suited to the task
of balancing the various interests and norms at work in informed consent law.154
Furthermore, it is not necessary to employ such a right, not even to remedy the
inadequacies of the disclosure standards in Georgia, Pennsylvania, and Texas, because
other options exist.
152

See supra notes 97 through 102 and the accompanying text.
See 25 Tex. Adm. Code sections601.3(c)(1) (appendectomy), 601.3(c)(9) (colonoscopy), 601.3(i)(1)
(breast biopsy), 601.3(o)(3) (lung biopsy).
154
See generally Elaine W. Shoben, Uncommon Law and the Bill of Rights: The Woes of
Constitutionalizing Common-law Torts, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 173 (1992).
153

49

45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. ___ (forthcoming 2010)

States’ disclosure laws exist against a backdrop of other legal and non-legal
sources for encouraging and enforcing the communication of adequate information from
doctor to patient, which diminish the need for a substantive due process right to such
information. For example, informed consent is a doctrine of medical ethics as well as
law,155 and the doctrine, including the ethical obligation of physicians to assure that
patients are well informed, is a featured part of medical ethics curricula that all U.S.
medical schools, as a condition of their accreditation, are required to incorporate into
their educational programs.156 Additionally, many physician organizations have
incorporated a commitment to fully informed medical decision-making into their policy
statements.157 While such ethical standards are considered aspirational and do not
establish standards of care enforceable through professional liability, they can form a
basis for disciplinary action against physicians by state licensing agencies. For example,
Pennsylvania’s Board of Medical Examiners has the authority to discipline physicians for
“immoral or unprofessional conduct,” which are defined to include “departure from or
failing to conform to an ethical . . . standard of the profession.”158 Thus, a board of
medical examiners could discipline a physician for failing to provide material treatment
information to patients even where the failure to provide such information would not
constitute professional negligence.
Hospital accreditation standards of the Joint Commission provide an even more
compelling example of indirect, national regulation of informed consent disclosures. The
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Joint Commission is the leading private accreditation organization for health care
institutions in the United States. Hospitals with Joint Commission accreditation are
deemed by regulation to satisfy Medicare’s “conditions of participation.”159 The
overwhelming majority of U.S. hospitals participate in Medicare, and most of them
qualify for Medicare participation through Joint Commission accreditation. Thus, the
Joint Commission’s accreditation standards have acquired the force of law through their
endorsement by Medicare.160
Joint Commission standards include standards related to informed consent and the
disclosure of material treatment information in particular. They require that a hospital
have in place a policy and procedure to assure that physicians practicing in the hospital
discuss with patients the risks and benefits of proposed treatments, reasonable alternative
treatments, and the risks and benefits of those alternatives.161 Physicians, by accepting
privileges to admit patients to a hospital accredited by the Joint Commission, agree to
abide by the hospital’s policies and procedures, including those that incorporate this
disclosure standard. In this way a physician becomes contractually obligated to provide
material information to any hospital patient considering any form of treatment even if the
physician practices in a state where the disclosure of material treatment information is
required for some but not all treatments.162
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Even without the assurances provided by this backdrop of ethical and
accreditation standards, the need for a substantive due process right to receive material
treatment information is diminished by the availability of an equal protection claim, at
least whenever there is state action. Although the legal obligation to disclose material
treatment information in some states applies to only certain procedures, every state
imposes such a duty of disclosure on physicians for at least some forms of treatment.
Consequently, an equal protection argument can be used to expand the applicability of a
state’s own duty to disclose material treatment information.163
For example, consider how such a claim might be used to challenge Pennsylvania
law. There, the duty to disclose material treatment information has been interpreted to
apply only to surgery, the use of anesthesia for surgery, radiation, chemotherapy, blood
transfusions, inserting a surgical devise or appliance, the administration of an
experimental drug or an approved drug in an experimental manner, and the
administration of an experimental device or an approved device in an experimental
manner.164 A review of the list does not reveal any reason why it contains the forms of
treatment it does or why it does not also contain others.165 Certainly there are
prescription medications that, even when used for their approved purpose, are as risky to
a patient as chemotherapy or some other treatment on the list. The same can be said for a
variety of diagnostic procedures. And yet patients considering those procedures are not
afforded the same informational rights as patients considering listed procedures. Thus,
even though the division of medical treatments into the categories of “on” or “off” the
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statutory list does not involve a suspect classification that would trigger strict scrutiny of
the categorization, it is nonetheless susceptible to attack on equal protection grounds
because the categorization appears to lack even a rational basis.166 Accordingly, the
claim could be used to extend the informational protections associated with some
treatments to other treatments with similar risk profiles.
The value of an equal protection claim is that it addresses a state’s uneven
application of its requirement that physicians disclose material treatment information, and
it does so without deciding whether such a disclosure standard is inherent in the
Constitution. The Equal Protection clause “creates no substantive rights.”167 Instead, it
draws its substance from existing state law and inquires whether similarly situated cases
are being treated similarly under that law.168

Conclusion
White and its progeny recognize a substantive due process right to treatment
information that mimics disclosure rules that determine liability under state informed
consent law. It is claimed to be a right derived from the right to refuse treatment that was
acknowledged by Cruzan as a fundamental liberty interest that could be inferred from the
Supreme Court’s substantive due process rulings, and it would require state actors to
assure that individuals receive (whether or not they ask for it) all information reasonably
necessary for informed medical decision-making.
As this Article has argued, the doctrinal grounds for the claimed right are weak,
and public policy considerations counsel against it. Moreover, the availability of other
166
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avenues both for protecting the interest of prisoners in receiving material treatment
information and for correcting inadequate disclosure standards in states like Georgia,
Louisiana, Pennsylvania and Texas. Consequently, White and its progeny should be
overruled.
While the a constitutional right to material treatment information is a tempting fix
for disclosure laws that are grossly inadequate in a few States, such a right is unnecessary
and comes a too high a price. Other legal and non-legal sources for assuring that patients
are well informed as they make treatment decisions and the availability of an equal
protection claim in states where disclosure rules are most lacking provide sufficient
protection.
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